Complicity in Destruction III:
HOW GLOBAL CORPORATIONS ENABLE VIOLATIONS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON
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Every day, soybeans, meat, metals, minerals, and other commodities produced on a large scale in the Brazilian Amazon are shipped to South America, Europe, China, the United States, and other global markets. Too often these commodities leave a scourge of human rights abuses and environmental devastation that threaten the future of the world's largest rainforest and its peoples, and with it the fate of our climate.

The flow of foreign investments into companies operating in the Brazilian Amazon is an intricate international network that financially enables actors responsible for egregious socio-environmental crimes. Within this extractive economic paradigm, Indigenous peoples are often treated as an "obstacle to development" and their lands are invaded, occupied, looted, and destroyed. Led by Jair Bolsonaro – Brazil's self-declared anti-environmental and anti-Indigenous president – the country's federal government is actively facilitating today's mounting crisis.

A leading driver of Amazon deforestation is the theft of lands in protected areas, such as Indigenous Territories (TIs) and Conservation Units (UCs) for land speculation, in which illegal deforestation and criminal arson are used to convert vast swaths of primary forest to agricultural plots for the benefit of a handful of powerful actors. It's no coincidence that the Amazonian municipalities with the greatest number of fires in 2019 were also those with the highest rates of deforestation. Influential national and international economic interests are complicit in this plundering of public forests and its resulting violence against Indigenous and traditional peoples.

The continued assault upon forest peoples can be detrimental to the Amazon considering that they are proven to be the best stewards of the rainforest. Studies show that TIs are the ultimate barrier against deforestation and forest degradation. Protected areas in the Brazilian Amazon including those inhabited by forest peoples hold 56 percent of the total carbon stock in the Brazilian Amazon.

This new edition of Complicity in Destruction, published by the Association of Brazil's Indigenous Peoples (APIB) in partnership with Amazon Watch, is based on research conducted by the investigative journalism outlet De Olho Nos Ruralistas (Ruralista Watch - DONR) and the Dutch sustainability research consultancy Profundo. It reveals how a network of leading international financial institutions is linked to conflicts on Indigenous lands, illegal deforestation, land grabbing, the weakening of environmental protections, and the production and export of conflict commodities.

By investigating actors involved in the invasion and deforestation of TIs – as well as other rights abuses since 2017 – DONR identified a set of Brazilian companies that was then cross-referenced by Profundo to identify international buyers and investors whose patronage enabled this behavior. This report's findings show that companies representing three key Brazilian sectors – mining, agribusiness, and energy – have been directly or indirectly involved in conflicts affecting Indigenous peoples and their territories.

Case studies are presented covering the Amazonian states of Pará, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Roraima, and Amazonas, involving the mining companies Vale, Anglo American, Belo Sun, and Potassio do Brasil; agribusiness companies Cargill, JBS, Cosan/Raizen; and energy companies Energisa Mato Grosso, Bons Futuro Energia, Equatorial Energia Maranhão, and Eletronorte.

Alongside these actors, our findings identify six major U.S.-based financial institutions – BlackRock, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Vanguard, Bank of America, and Dimensional Fund Advisors – that contributed more than US$18 billion (100 billion BRL) to the companies between 2017 and 2020. Unraveling this network demonstrates how highly problematic companies operating in the Brazilian Amazon are intertwined with global financial leaders, shining a spotlight on corporate malfeasance and its enablers.

The companies are but a few of the many actors implicated in today's devastation of the Brazilian Amazon. They do not operate alone, and their actions should be understood as emblematic of greater trends that increasingly imperil the rainforest, and with it our collective wellbeing.

The human rights and environmental abuses documented in this report would not be possible without the extensive investments of international financial leaders. Global markets have the power to either enable or moderate Bolsonaro's disastrous Amazon agenda, thereby permitting or preventing the destruction of the rainforest. APIB, Amazon Watch, and a coalition of Brazilian and international allies are calling on leading market actors to cease fueling the problem and use their influence to become part of the solution.

This report provides recommendations for companies operating in or with projects in Brazil, importers of Brazilian products, financial institutions investing in these companies or operations, and governments and policymakers responsible for oversight of the private sector. It is imperative that they forge and adhere to policies that respect Indigenous rights and the environment; refrain from all activities that may contribute to illegal deforestation and threats to Indigenous rights and territories (including activities of their suppliers); create stronger monitoring mechanisms and conduct due diligence to identify possible violations; and use their power to demand that imported products are not contributing to the destruction of the Amazon. Business as usual is no longer an option.
NOTE FROM
APIB

There is no doubt that both the illegal encroachment across Indigenous Territories and the unrestrained increase in the destruction of Brazilian biomes are directly connected to the benefits reaped by the private sector in extractive industries. The harmful invasions of Indigenous lands by squatters, miners, and loggers leave a trail of environmental destruction and racially-motivated murders of the peoples native to the land.

This war on our lives led us to prepare this important document with Amazon Watch for the second year in a row. This report merges the different strengths of APIB, Amazon Watch, and other allies to investigate and cross-check data. It explains how companies operating in Brazil and international corporations collaborate, increasing threats to Brazil’s Indigenous peoples, worsening an already precarious situation, and also playing a fundamental role in increasing myriad forms of environmental destruction.

This report is crucial for the Indigenous movement in Brazil and a milestone that validates our fight to guarantee and secure respect for the rights of our peoples. It is also a powerful tool in conversations with foreign governments, buyers of goods from Brazil, and global investors, because it clearly outlines the harmful consequences of large corporations’ supply chains that operate without due diligence.

We propose actions to change this reality. Clear proposals such as those outlined in this report can help structure demands to fight impunity in Brazil and support the defense of our territories and peoples while we preserve fundamental ecosystems to guarantee life on this planet.
This report also shows how, together with the private sector, the current Brazilian government remains actively responsible for destroying the environment, Indigenous rights, and our common future.

The former provisional presidential decree 910, modified to become Bill no. 2633 (PL da Grilagem, or Land-grabbers Law) in Congress, still imposes a significant threat to Indigenous lands by legalizing the sale of stolen lands in the Legal Amazon. And, despite the recent victory before the Federal Supreme Court (today an even more essential institution for defending democracy and guaranteeing rights in Brazil), we still cannot guarantee that invaders will be removed from Indigenous lands, even if they risk spreading the novel coronavirus. These events converging with the Bolsonaro administration’s negligent and genocidal behavior further deteriorate the already fragile situation of Indigenous peoples within the country.

This report complements the overwhelming growth of support for the Indigenous movement in Brazil. At the end of 2019, a delegation of Indigenous leaders traveled through 12 European countries to promote our cause and defend Indigenous lives under the slogan, “Indigenous Blood, Not a Single Drop More!” This delegation allowed APIB to make a wide range of contacts with allies in Europe and around the world, solidifying the presence of Brazil’s Indigenous peoples in high-impact negotiations with the European Union, England, Norway, the United States, China, the Congo and Indonesia, in addition to neighboring Latin American countries.

Additionally, Indigenous lawyers and APIB’s legal advisors are now a powerful legal defense team on the front lines in Brazil. The unanimous compliance with the Claim of Non-compliance with Fundamental Precept (ADPF) 709 at Brazil’s Supreme Court (STF), presented and led by APIB in partnership with various civil society organizations and political parties, is a historic milestone for the Indigenous peoples of Brazil and all Brazilians because it acknowledges that the government failed to protect Indigenous peoples against the pandemic. It is an unprecedented achievement to guarantee the protection of Indigenous peoples and to establish the importance of Indigenous Brazilians in building a more just country.

All of these extraordinary actions culminated in the Indigenous Emergency Plan to Combat COVID-19, launched in August 2020. During such a dark period in our history, Indigenous peoples managed, through their solidarity and collective will, to enlist national and international partners to devise a comprehensive plan of action that could respond to the genocidal inaction of the federal government.

As such, a rapid response plan to combat the pandemic and protect Indigenous peoples was created. We already know this, but the world should also know that protecting the rainforest and its communities can help prevent the next pandemic. And finally, in September, we launched the Amazon or Bolsonaro: Which Side Are You On? campaign, also titled #DefundBolsonaro, in partnership with several environmental protection organizations in the country and supported by international organizations, to pressure and raise awareness among companies, global leaders, consumers, and investors to dissociate from President Jair Bolsonaro to avoid deforestation in the Amazon. The campaign, which has gained international prominence, also connects the current destruction in the Amazon rainforest with the major brands that source from suppliers that are complicit in the criminal arson and who resell to consumers without their knowledge. Unfortunately, instead of fulfilling its constitutional oaths and presenting the nation with a plan for the fires and to protect the economy and national reputation, the Brazilian government attacked APIB and its executive coordinator, Sonia Guajajara, accusing the organization of committing the crime of “harming the country.” APIB rejects the government’s claims. Furthermore, we understand that the biggest crime harming our country is actually the government’s failure to protect our biomes, protected areas, and Indigenous lands from illegal fires, land grabbing, and deforestation. That is the real theft of our wealth. We will continue our fight while studying the appropriate legal measures against these attacks. We’re not alone.
The Indigenous mobilization is collective and inclusive, so actions taken with each of our partners from local to international levels are of paramount importance. We are grateful for Amazon Watch’s partnership in the preparation of this document and for being open to the extensive APIB additions.

Finally, we, the Indigenous peoples of Brazil, want this report to be an effective tool so that authorities, the private sector, investors, journalists, and civil society can understand how international financing impacts extractive activities in the Amazon and how each of these actions increases the vulnerability of Indigenous peoples and environmental destruction. Consequently, we want this information to spearhead the implementation of new laws and the enforcement of existing ones, aimed at maintaining the environmental protection and the ancient cultures that have been around for millennia, our ways of life, and our rights.

Alberto Terena, Chicão Terena, Dinaman Tuxá, Elizeu Guarani Kaiowá, Kerexu Yxapyry, Kretã Kaingang, and Sonia Guajajara

Executive Coordinating Committee of the Association of Brazil’s Indigenous Peoples (APIB)

The following regional Indigenous organizations are part of APIB:

- Indigenous Peoples’ Coalition of the Northeast
- Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo (APOINME)
- The Terena Council
- Coalition of Indigenous Peoples of Southeast Brazil (ARPIN Sudeste)
- Coalition of Indigenous Peoples of Southern Brazil (ARPINSUL)
- Great Assembly of the Guarani People (ATY GUASU)
- Coordination of Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon (COIAB)
- The Guarani Yvyrupa Commission
This report, organized by the Association of Brazil’s Indigenous Peoples (APIB) in partnership with Amazon Watch, is based on research by the De Olho Nos Ruralistas (Ruralista Watch - DONR) investigative journalism outlet and the Dutch research consultancy on sustainability, Profundo.

Local conflicts involving Brazilian and foreign companies were identified based on a series of interviews with Indigenous associations and leaders from across Brazil. A query was also conducted in the database of the Regional Federal Appellate Court of the 1st Region\(^5\) and the Federal Prosecution Office (MPF), which identified lawsuits related to individuals and legal entities involving Indigenous lands or that had Brazil’s national Indigenous agency FUNAI (Fundação Nacional do Índio) or associations representing Indigenous peoples among its parties.

Research also focused on publicly available data regarding processes of eviction of “landowners” intruding on Indigenous Territories (TIs).

From this initial query, DONR created a database of 797 judicial cases involving disputes over Indigenous territory demarcation, decisions on land expropriation, eviction and land maintenance processes, revocation of environmental licenses, and compensation for environmental or other damages. From this list, we prioritized cases that met the following criteria: a) cases associated with a legal entity with an active status in the Federal Revenue Service; b) cases in which the legal entity involved was directly or indirectly linked to export chains; c) cases which have been opened in the justice system or which, by some of the parties involved, have undergone updates, advances, or changes between 2018 and 2020. The findings were cross-referenced with reports of operations against deforestation and invasion of Indigenous areas carried out by the Federal Police between 2018 and 2020; pre-existing databases; further corroboration of Indigenous associations’ informal and formal public statements denouncing violations in Indigenous Territories during the span of the research; and investigative journalism pieces.

Based on these initial results, Profundo researched supply chains and financial links by cross-checking data narrowing the list of companies down to the 11 Brazilian and multinational companies mentioned in this report. The 11 cases highlighted feature documented conflicts in which the direct or indirect activities of a company threatened Indigenous lands\(^6\) and/or violated the rights of Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon.

The report lists general data from the main buyers of the companies if specific commercial data was unavailable or in situations where activities were still in the planning stages, thus lacking an established supply chain. The supply chain information for the 11 highlighted companies were taken from sources such as websites and company reports and shipping records.

Data on financial relations between the companies mentioned in this report and financial institutions were collected from company publications, financial databases (Bloomberg, Refinitiv), loan records, Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) documentation on direct and indirect financing, data from companies specializing in trade and project finance, finance development institutions, and other relevant sources of information. The data were collected in June 2020 and cover from January 2017 to June 2020. Information on equity holdings and debt securities (bonds) corresponds to the most recent dates obtained from Refinitiv\(^7\) and Thomson EMAXX\(^8\). Information on loans, credits, and underwriting services is included from January 2017 to the most recent available dates. The only loans included in the report are those that had not yet matured at the time of the survey.

The six financial institutions mentioned in this report were highlighted because of the frequency in which they appear (investing in half or more of the companies mentioned in the case studies), and because they are headquartered in the United States, as is Amazon Watch, which facilitates the possibility of greater dialogue, engagement, and campaigning.

Only institutional investors were included in the analysis. A comprehensive list of financial relationships identified by Profundo is included in Appendix I of this document.

The figures mentioned in the report refer to all of the institutions’ global investments and loans in the companies listed and are therefore not figures specific to the Brazil case studies. The amounts illustrate how their financing supports these companies as a whole, and how this is a flawed business model that has been unable to guarantee respect for socio-environmental and Indigenous peoples’ rights.
This report identifies three key sectors of Brazil’s economy responsible for conflicts with Amazonian Indigenous peoples: mining, agribusiness, and energy. Such conflicts stem from the private sector’s exploitation of Indigenous lands, wherein companies ignore direct attacks on these lands by land-grabbers and other local actors, as well as systematically disregard laws that protect Indigenous lands and rights, especially the right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent.

Based on case studies from each sector, we have identified the following Brazilian and international companies involved, directly or indirectly, in situations involving land conflicts and violations of socio-environmental and Indigenous rights in the Brazilian Amazon since 2017, and which also depend on the patronage of international buyers and/or investors, as detailed below.

COMMODITY-DRIVEN DESTRUCTION

Photo: Tommaso Protti/Greenpeace
Founded in 1942, Vale is a Brazilian and global mining giant. The second-largest producer of iron ore (385 million tons) and nickel (244.6 million tons) on the planet, Vale also mines manganese, copper, bauxite, aluminum, gold, silver, cobalt, and coal, among other metals and minerals. The company operates in more than 30 countries on five continents, has more than 71,000 employees and 247,000 shareholders, and is one of the most prominent companies on the New York Stock Exchange. Its net operating revenue was US$37.5 billion in 2019.

In the Amazonian state of Pará, Vale operates the Carajás Complex, the largest iron ore extraction operation in the world. The ore is transported by a railway almost 1,000 kilometers long, which departs from Carajás, Pará, and ends at the Port of Ponta da Madeira, in São Luís, Maranhão. The railroad is essential to export the products sold by Vale, whose primary customer is China.

Vale has amassed a great many conflicts with Indigenous peoples in this region. The company is accused of contaminating the Cateté River, the primary source of water on the Xikrin Indigenous Land. In legal action taken in 2018 by the Xikrin, they demonstrated the direct impact that mining operations have had on the Xikrin and Kayapó people’s way of life. However, the mining company, which has had its operations at the Onça Puma mine halted several times, has tried to deny these impacts. More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic—which has not prompted Vale to pause its activities—has worsened the situation of the Indigenous peoples in the region. The Xikrin are also demanding redress for last year’s gold mining activities and the copper mining activities that are currently underway.

The Carajás Railway directly affects four Indigenous lands: Rio Pindaré, Mãe Maria, Xikrin, and Arariboia. Indigenous peoples in the region have accused the company of consistently failing to comply with agreements it signed to mitigate the impacts of its operations.

Although the company denies it, Vale also has submitted hundreds of requests for mining exploration on Indigenous lands in the Amazon. Among its 236 requests, those that stand out include: 68 mining requests on the Trombetas/Mapuera TI, which is located in the states of Roraima, Amazonas, and Pará; 52 requests for the Munduruku TI in Pará; 37 for the Xikrin do Rio Cateté TI in Pará; 35 for the Kayabi TI in Pará; and 26 for the Menkragnoti/Baú TIs in Mato Grosso and Pará.

Furthermore, a subsidiary of Vale, Biopalma, which processes palm oil in Pará, uses massive amounts of pesticides on its plantations which are directly affecting the health of the Tembé people in addition to polluting local rivers and streams. This contamination was recently confirmed by technical analysis.

Vale filed 57 of the total 130 mining requirements conflicting with the boundaries of the Munduruku Indigenous Territory.

(Source: see References on page 87)
Vale’s global distribution chain includes giants such as the Indian steel company ArcelorMittal, South Korean companies Hyundai and POSCO, the U.S. company Nucor Steel, and German company ThyssenKrupp.

The company’s principal institutional investors include BlackRock, Capital Research Global Investors, and Vanguard – all based in the U.S. – which together hold US$11 billion worth of shares in Vale. Citibank acts as a depositary for Vale’s stocks. Large financial institutions such as Morgan Stanley, Santander, JPMorgan Chase, and UBS are also Vale shareholders.

Among the main financiers of the company from 2017 to May 2020 are Citigroup (U.S.), the SMBC Group (Japan), and Crédit Agricole (France), which have contributed US$624 million each. China’s New Development Bank has invested US$300 million in Vale. Other financiers during this period include Barclays, Bank of America, Scotiabank, Standard Chartered, HSBC, and JPMorgan Chase, with contributions of US$87 million each.

Although the incident did not take place in the Amazon, it is impossible to talk about Vale without mentioning its involvement in one of the worst environmental disasters in Brazilian history. In November 2015, the rupture of a tailings dam in the state of Minas Gerais, in southeast Brazil, caused a massive spill of toxic chemicals that turned into mud that spread along nearly 700 kilometers until it reached, and polluted, the Atlantic Ocean in the neighboring state of Espírito Santo.

The resulting destruction of the Doce River directly affected the Indigenous Krenak people in Governador Valadares, Minas Gerais. Ailton Krenak, a writer and prominent Indigenous thinker, describes the great importance of the Doce River to his people. “The river is irreplaceable because we simply cannot accept that it is dead. That is why we are at the left riverbank of the Doce River holding a vigil for the body of our relative, Watu [the Krenak name for the Doce River], who is our grandfather. The Krenaks will not leave. Even if Vale bombards the village to drive out the Krenak, they will resist. This is something that is very difficult for those who are not going through this to understand.”

Yan Xikrin, a leader of the Xikrin people

VALE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LARGEST ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS IN BRAZIL

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In the state of Espírito Santo, the Tupiniquim people are also fighting for redress because the water in their region has been completely contaminated.

Another of Vale’s tailings dams ruptured in January 2019, this time in Brumadinho, also in Minas Gerais, killing 270 people and affecting the Naô Xohã village of the Pataxó Hã-hã-hãe people. The Pataxó were forced to move and today live on the outskirts of the city of Belo Horizonte. In September 2020, 20 months after the dam rupture at Brumadinho, Vale announced US$2.21 billion (12.4 billion BRL) in compensation to shareholders, while it still had not adequately compensated the communities affected or the families of the victims.
2. ANGLO AMERICAN

One of the largest mining companies in the world, the century-old Anglo American, based in England and South Africa, mines diamonds, copper, platinum, iron ore, coal, and nickel in Australia, Africa, Latin America, North America, and Europe. The operating result of the mining company was US$10 billion in 2019, and it has paid more than US$1.4 billion to its shareholders over the past two years.

The company has 4,000 employees in Brazil, and a project that stands out in the country is its Minas-Rio operation, which has the capacity to process up to 26.5 million tons of iron ore per year and includes the largest slurry pipeline in the world, which extends more than 500 kilometers between the states of Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro.

We highlight this case due to the risks that the activities of this company may present to the territories and to the ways of life of the Indigenous peoples of the Amazon. Together with two Brazilian subsidiaries, Mineração Itamaracá and Mineração Tanagra, Anglo American has registered almost 300 requests for authorization to survey with the Agência Nacional de Mineração (National Mining Agency) for areas that include Amazonian Indigenous lands. These requests include areas corresponding with 18 Indigenous Territories, some of which are inhabited by peoples in voluntary isolation. The most recent target of Anglo American is the disputed Sawré Muybu Indigenous Territory at the Middle Tapajós River, inhabited by the Munduruku people, the official titling of which has languished in the hands of the federal government. The mining company submitted five of these requests between 2017 and 2019, demonstrating its efforts to operate in this territory despite being aware of the prohibition against mining on Indigenous lands. It would appear the company is counting on the legislative changes proposed by the Bolsonaro regime to allow mining on Indigenous Territories to validate its prospecting permits.

The Pariri Indigenous Association represents the Munduruku of the Middle Tapajós and has systematically opposed mining on Indigenous lands. The Association stated: “We are going to continue to protest against the authorization of mining on Indigenous land. We will not accept more destruction. Our rivers are polluted with mercury, and our fish are dying. We are going to take back control of our territory. We have our own government, and everyone has to respect it. We are not going to stop fighting until we have resolved our problems.”

2. ANGLO AMERICAN

Other Anglo American mines already in operation supply nickel to some of the largest steel producers in the world, such as North American Stainless (U.S.), Glencore (Switzerland), Outokumpu (Finland), and POSCO (South Korea).

From January 2017 to May 2020, Anglo American received no less than US$14.5 billion from 25 financial institutions from around the world, based in countries such as the United States, China, Japan, Australia, Switzerland, Canada, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.

Among these international financiers are Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, BNP Paribas, Mizuho Financial, Standard Chartered, Royal Bank of Canada, Barclays, Commerzbank, HSBC, Crédit Agricole, Morgan Stanley, ANZ, and Goldman Sachs, as well as several others.

“Every mining, soy, or infrastructure project affects Indigenous land. For example, the construction of a hydroelectric power plant near our territory affects us because it will lead to a shortage of fish, and surrounding forest land will die either due to drought or flooding. We have reports of destruction in places that are sacred to our peoples.

And on many of these lands, who is involved in all this destruction? Many people and companies from outside. And these people and companies are affecting Indigenous lands. We are very concerned about this model of development that, for us, is a model of death.

Mining is causing a great deal of severe impacts. It pollutes our drinking water, contaminates our fish, and leaves only destruction. And the guilty parties are the countries that are buying the iron, gold, and soy. Today we have a government that is encouraging the invasion of our territories. And the first world countries with interests in exploiting the Amazon have the blood of Indigenous people on their hands. These big companies come to our towns and say nice things, like they are going to bring water and schools to us, but it is all a lie. Because as soon as they arrive, they start to trample on the rights of traditional peoples, both Indigenous and riverine.”

Alessandra Munduruku, a leader and warrior of the Munduruku people.
Potássio do Brasil is a Brazilian fertilizer company created in 2009 that is behind a megaproject for potassium mining in the state of Amazonas. Despite claiming on its website that it respects “the environment and the rights of Indigenous peoples,” Potássio is accused of having drilled in areas within the Jauary TI, inhabited by the Mura people and in areas adjacent to other Indigenous lands that are vital to the livelihood of Indigenous communities, which has generated controversy. In addition to the risk of contaminating the groundwater of the region with mining waste, the project could also adversely affect the Paracuhuba TI.

In 2015, the company received an environmental license from the Instituto de Proteção Ambiental do Amazonas (Amazonas Environmental Protection Institute or IPAAM) without having carried out a process of Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation with affected Indigenous groups, as required by ILO Convention 169. After legal action taken by the Federal Prosecutor Office, the company signed an agreement requiring it to consult with the Mura people, who received the proposal for the project in November of 2019.

Potássio do Brasil is not in full operation, which prevents its international buyers from being identified. On its website, it claims to be a privately-held company, controlled by Brazilian and foreign investors. The complete list of the company’s current financiers or shareholders was unavailable from the accessible databases. There is a general lack of publicly available information on companies of this nature and the lack of transparency of the sector as a whole.

However, it is known that Potássio do Brasil is part of the portfolio of Forbes & Manhattan (F&M), a privately-held merchant bank specializing in the creation of mining companies that develop projects worldwide. F&M mines gold in Africa, ferrous metals in Ukraine, and copper in North America, where it also drills for oil and gas. In February 2020, F&M also listed Belo Sun among its ventures; however, the company no longer publicly appears in its portfolio. Potássio do Brasil is far along in the process of seeking new investors, having announced that it has raised US$198 million since initiating operations.

Canadian mining company Belo Sun intends to establish one of the largest open-pit gold mining operations in Latin America straddling a large and highly biodiverse stretch of the Xingu River known as the Volta Grande (Big Bend) in Pará state. This region, crisscrossed by the borders of various Indigenous lands, is already suffering the disastrous effects of the construction of the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam.

In one of its presentations to investors, Belo Sun highlights that the operation would be “the largest undeveloped gold project in Brazil” that capital payback would be in less than two years, that the company would have an estimated market capitalization of US$160 million in February 2020, and that current shareholding is distributed among Canadian, European, and American funds.

Belo Sun currently has 11 requests for authorization to prospect mining that are being processed by the National Mining Agency for areas that correspond with territory belonging to Arara de Volta Grande do Xingu and Xicrin of Trincheira Bacajá. While licensing of the gold mining project has been suspended and faces six lawsuits, Belo Sun continues to prospect for gold in the area and has continued to work toward its 2019 and 2020 goals. A technical report has shown that the project is fraught with structural flaws.

The project would also affect the Juruna people living on the Paquicamba Indigenous Land. The Juruna assert that they will not accept any project that would remove them from the Xingu River or prevent their communities from living along the river. The Juruna stated: “We know that we have the right to be consulted, to defend our land and traditions, to fight for decent living conditions, and to choose our development priorities. Neither the government nor any company can deny us these rights.”

Since Belo Sun has not actually begun to operate in Brazil, information is unavailable about its international buyers. However, there are already investors. Among the ten main shareholders of Belo Sun are U.S.-based Palmredo Holdings, Royal Bank of Canada, and BlackRock. Together, these three hold US$33 million worth of the mining company’s shares.
Cargill is one of the largest commodity traders on the planet and had a net revenue in Brazil of US$8.9 billion (50 billion BRL) in 2019.75 It was founded more than 150 years ago and has 155,000 employees across 70 different countries.76 The company operates in many different sectors, from the agricultural to the financial, and has a strong presence in the food, energy, and steel industries. Cargill's annual revenue worldwide was US$114.6 billion in 2019.77

Despite being a signatory to the Amazon Soy Moratorium and claiming that around 95 percent of its 2018-2019 harvest was free of deforestation or the conversion of forestland to farmland,78 Cargill remains one of the soy traders most exposed to risks of involvement in deforestation, according to data from the Trase platform. In 2018, it was the second largest exporter of soy products among soy traders in the 15 municipalities with the largest area of soy fields belonging to farms connected to illegal deforestation in the state of Mato Grosso.79

In September 2018, due to pressure by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office80, Brazil’s National Indigenous Agency (FUNAI) resumed the titling process for the Munduruku of Planalto Santareno Indigenous Land, and ten farmers linked to the Rural Union of Santarém (SIRSAN) sued81 alleging they owned property in the area claimed by the Munduruku. When their case was denied and the farmers were impeded from taking further legal action to interfere with the titling process, the group began to take political action to delay the case,82 which was recently put on hold due to the restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. These farmers are allegedly potential soy suppliers to Cargill. “All producers here in our region are registered with Cargill”, according to the president of their rural union86, one of the farmers connected to the case. This suggests that Cargill sources from soy farmers who are occupying Munduruku lands and who are working to prevent the demarcation of Indigenous lands in the region.

The soy supply chain is notoriously lacking in transparency, which makes it difficult to identify the companies that buy directly from the regions mentioned above. In 2018, according to data from the Trase platform,87 soybeans transported by Cargill from Santarém were destined primarily for Spain (30.1 percent), overtaking China (15.9 percent), which is followed by Belgium (14.4 percent), and the United Kingdom (12.2 percent).

According to the data collected for this report, banks such as BNP Paribas, JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Bank of America, Barclays, and Citigroup have loaned between US$306 million and US$1 billion each to Cargill between January 2017 and May 2020.88 Cargill’s leading investors include Prudential Financial, American International Group (AIG), and MetLife.

When it comes to soy, what we see is deforestation increasing more and more to make way for [the crop]. As a result, our rivers, our streams are drying up. We Indigenous people do not make soy soup, do not feed our children soy. We see many soy plantations; sometimes, there are 100 thousand hectares per owner.... More and more land and deforestation—they seek more and more land. All over the region where Cargill operates, they are destroying the environment around them and driving out or threatening the Indigenous people that live there.”

Alessandra Munduruku, a leader of the Munduruku people.

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JBS is the world’s largest meat producer, the largest private company in Brazil outside the financial sector,99 and the second-largest food producer on the planet. The company has more than 230,000 employees across 15 countries100 for operations related to everything from fresh meat to ready-made frozen dinners.

JBS also operates in various industries related to its production chain, such as leather, biodiesel, packaging, and transportation. The company claims that its products are consumed in 190 countries.

JBS closed out 2019 with a net revenue of US$36.45 billion (204.5 billion BRL),101 the highest ever recorded in the company’s history, and an increase of 12.6 percent compared to 2018. Its net income last year was US$1.09 billion (6.1 billion BRL).

JBS has been at the center of a number of socio-environmental and human rights violations in the Amazon in recent years. Furthermore, increasing evidence is emerging indicating that this Brazilian giant has systematically proven to be incapable of exercising adequate control over its supply chain.102

Agência Pública recently revealed that a rancher93 from Mato Grosso, who has accumulated more than US$3.56 million (20 million BRL) in fines for environmental infractions since 2000 for deforestation in the Amazon, raises cattle illegally on the Kayabi Indigenous Land and then sells the livestock to JBS.94

The true origin of thousands of cattle have been concealed by this rancher. In a process known as “cattle laundering,” used to obscure illegal deforestation, infractions committed on the Indigenous land, and other illegal acts associated with ranching practices, the animals are then claimed to be sourced from a ranch supposedly in compliance with the law, to then be sold to JBS.95

Situations like this continue to occur, even though more than a decade ago JBS committed to eliminate farms guilty of illegal deforestation from its entire supply chain and signed the “Meat TAC” (a Deferred Prosecution Agreement) with the Brazilian Federal Public Ministry.102 This agreement prohibits the company from slaughtering cattle raised on Indigenous lands, environmental reserves, and ranches that began operations without proper environmental operating licensing or that have been discovered to use slave labor.93

In July 2020, a report from Amnesty International100 revealed that cattle raised illegally on protected areas of the Brazilian Amazon rainforest entered JBS’s supply chain, including cattle from ranches encroaching on the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau Indigenous Land.

On the other hand, global pressure on JBS has increased, including from financiers. According to analysts from British bank HSBC101, JBS “has no vision, action plan, timeline, technology or solution” for monitoring its supply chain to detect cattle coming from ranches involved in the destruction of the Amazon.

In September 2020, JBS made an announcement committing itself to monitoring its entire supply chain, including indirect suppliers, by 2025. This is in response to financial and reputational pressures placed upon the company, demanding that JBS ensure the preservation of the forest and avoid the company’s complicity in illegal deforestation and Indigenous rights violations in the region. However, JBS promised to monitor its indirect suppliers by 2011 and clearly failed to meet this benchmark.

China is currently the leading destination for JBS’s exports, representing 33.4 percent of the company’s total business in the second quarter of 2020.103 Nonetheless, subsidiaries such as JBS USA Beef, JBS USA Pork, and Pilgrim’s Pride, which manage the company’s operations in North America, Europe, and Australia, have a significant presence in the markets of these countries. A report published by Greenpeace International104 this year revealed that, despite the fact that only a small part of the UK’s imported meat comes from the Amazon, the leading supermarket and fast-food chains in the country—such as Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Burger King, McDonald’s, and KFC—source pork and chicken from Tulip and Moy Park, owned by JBS. Thus continuing trade with suppliers linked to deforestation and Indigenous rights violations in the Amazon.

Between 2017 and July 2020, JBS Global received more than US$5 billion in loans and underwriting from105 institutions such as British bank Barclays, the Royal Bank of Canada, and the BMO Financial Group, also of Canada.100 Furthermore, American financiers such as Fidelity Investments, BlackRock, JPMorgan Chase, Waddell & Reed Financial, and Vanguard hold US$1.6 billion worth of JBS’s shares and bonds.105
Cosan S.A., also known as Grupo Cosan, is a publicly-traded company and a world leader in the production, processing, and sale of sugarcane and ethanol. Among the group’s companies is a joint venture with the Dutch oil giant Shell called Raízen, which, in addition to producing and selling sugarcane derivatives (including ethanol), is one of the largest fuel distributors in Brazil.106 Today, along with Raízen, Comgás, the largest gas distributor in Brazil, and Rumo, the largest railroad operator in Latin America, are part of the Cosan Limited group. In 2019, Cosan posted a net profit of US$427.72 million (2.4 billion BRL).107

Part of this success hides a six-decade history of violating the rights of Indigenous peoples in Mato Grosso. In the 1960s, the Ometta family, which owned Cosan at the time, received authorization from the federal government to create a large agribusiness company called Suiá-Missú.108 This venture held between 800,000 and 1.7 million hectares of land in the region and was considered the largest land holding in Brazil.109 Its implementation involved the forced removal of the Xavante community from the Marãiwatsédé Indigenous Land and they were obligated to work on the farm, subjecting them to a form of modern slavery. It was only in the 2000s that the Xavante had part of their territory demarcated and ratified as an officially recognized Indigenous territory.110

In 2017, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office filed a public-interest civil action asking for US$23.14 million (129.83 million BRL) in reparations for the Xavante people of the Marãiwatsédé Indigenous Land as compensation for human rights violations linked to the construction of the Suiá-Missú agricultural project on Indigenous land. The defendants of the case are FUNAI, the state of Mato Grosso, and nine heirs of the Ometto family, who are partners at Cosan. In addition to the financial compensation, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office is also requesting an apology and environmental remediation of the area.

This case is not a recent event, and the Cosan Group no longer possesses land on the territory of the Marãiwatsédé Indigenous Land. Nonetheless, it is highlighted in this report because it may come to represent a historic achievement for the Xavante if the courts rule in favor of the Federal Prosecutor’s recommendation.

Furthermore, the ramifications of this story are experienced to this day. The community continues to deal with invasions by farmers, and the Marãiwatsédé Indigenous Land is the most deforested Indigenous land in the Legal Amazon, it lost 75.5 percent of its original vegetation cover.112

Moreover, half a century later, the power of the Ometto family remains intact. Rubens Ometto Silveira Mello, also a defendant in the Federal Prosecution Office’s lawsuit, became the first billionaire of the ethanol sector in the world in 2018.113 He is chairman of Cosan’s board of directors and was the largest individual donor in the 2018 elections,114 having donated US$1.18 million (6.63 million BRL) in total to 57 candidates.

Among the companies that buy the sugar exported by Cosan are CSC Sugar (USA), Wilmar International (Singapore), and Nestlé (Switzerland). In 2019, Nestlé acquired sugarcane directly from Raízen subsidiaries that obtained the product in the states of São Paulo and Mato Grosso do Sul.115

Part of the Energisa Group, the fifth-largest energy distributor in Brazil, Energisa Mato Grosso, was indicted in 2019 by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office for providing rural electrical infrastructure to squatters who have been carrying out invasions of the Urubu Branco Indigenous territory since 1998.118 According to a public civil action filed by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, the company denied access to the invaders’ personal data, while consistently denying electricity to the Indigenous villages in the area, claiming that their territory was under dispute. FUNAI and the federal government have also been indicted in the same case for a 16-year delay in securing the Tapirapé people rightful possession of their territory.119

BlackRock, JPMorgan Chase, Vanguard, and Bank of New York Mellon are among the principal shareholders of the Energisa Group.120 The group’s top creditors between 2017 and 2020 include Citigroup, which provided US$131 million, and Bank of America, which provided US$79 million. Furthermore, Citigroup has provided a direct loan of US$30 million to Energisa Mato Grosso.121

This company is part of the Bom Futuro Group, which belongs to the family of the former agricultural minister, senator, and governor of Mato Grosso, Blairo Maggi. The Indigenous Xavante people challenged Bom Futuro Energia for violating their right to prior consent regarding the construction of three small hydroelectric power plants on the Rio das Mortes and Cumbuco rivers, which will impact various Indigenous territories in Mato Grosso.122

The Xavante observed that the “Indigenous Component Study” for the licensing of the projects claims that only the Sangradouro Indigenous Land will be affected. However, according to them, the Merure Ti, belonging to the Bororo people, and the Areões, São Marcos, and Pimentel Barbosa TIs, belonging to the Xavante, will also be affected.123

Furthermore, the Xavante also protest business people, politicians, and representatives of farmers in the region that have interfered in the debates regarding fulfillment of the requirement for Free, Prior, and Informed Consent of the Xavante and Bororo peoples concerning the project.

“The Rio das Mortes passes through these lands and is central to the continuation of our life and our culture. It is our understanding that the participation of these communities is essential for the prior consent to be legitimate,” affirm the Xavante people in a motion filed on March 20, 2020.124

Throughout the course of this report’s research, specific information on the international financing of Bom Futuro Energia was publicly unavailable. The sole source of information on credit providers was for Bom Futuro Agrícola, the group’s agricultural subsidiary, from the Brazilian Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, BNDES). The U.S. institution John Deere Bank loaned US$42 million to this agricultural subsidiary between 2017 and 2020.125
A subsidiary of state-owned Eletrobras, the largest power company in Brazil, Eletronorte aims to install transmission lines that would run between the states of Roraima and Amazonas and pass directly through the lands of the Indigenous Waimiri-Atroari people.\textsuperscript{135}

Persecuted by Brazil’s former military dictatorship and reduced to 350 people after the deaths of 2,500 people over the last several decades, the Waimiri-Atroari demand the consultation and prior consent guaranteed to them by the Brazilian Constitution and ILO Convention 169.

In 2018, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office filed a public-interest civil action,\textsuperscript{136} demanding the Brazilian government pay reparations for the crime of genocide against the Waimiri-Atroari during the construction of BR-174, a Brazilian highway, which took place between 1974 and 1983, during the military dictatorship. According to survivors’ reports, military personnel sprayed poison and dropped explosives onto the region from helicopters, and ground troops shot and beheaded hundreds of Indigenous peoples.

A proposed supplementary law, PLP 275/2019,\textsuperscript{137} currently pending in the Senate, has increased the concerns of the Waimiri-Atroari people. This law, if passed, would declare the passage of electric power transmission lines through Indigenous lands a matter of public interest for the country, advancing projects currently in the assessment or licensing phases. While requiring that Indigenous communities be consulted and guaranteeing those affected receive financial compensation, the proposed legislation does not provide them the power to veto such projects, which in practice diminishes their ability to control their own lands.

In addition to the risks these projects pose for Indigenous lands, the Waimiri-Atroari fear that the project will also cause new issues due to the state’s inability to mitigate and prevent the serious problems that every major infrastructure project usually brings to the Amazon: uncontrolled immigration, the spread of diseases, increased violence, and land conflicts and invasions.\textsuperscript{138}

“We were all worried. All of us ask ourselves, ‘Is everything that took place in the 1970s going to happen all over again?’” says Marcelo Euepi Atroari.\textsuperscript{139} He adds that his people only demand the proper compensation due to them for the impacts of the installation of the transmission lines and that their right to prior consent be respected.

Among the most prominent investors in the Eletrobras group are Santander, which loaned US$1.6 billion between 2017 and 2020, Goldman Sachs (US$417 million), Bank of America (US$210 million), and Citigroup (US$90 million)\textsuperscript{140}. Among the group’s largest shareholders are the Bank of New York Mellon, BlackRock, Vanguard, and Miles Capital\textsuperscript{141}.

Equatorial Energia Maranhão, which until 2019 was called Companhia Energética do Maranhão (CEMAR), was privatized in the year 2000. It has been included in this report because of its history of conflicts with Indigenous peoples in the state of Maranhão regarding the installation of power lines.

Since 2014, the company has tried to accelerate the installation process of the Miranda do Norte-Três Marias transmission line, whose impacts will affect the Akroá-Gamella Indigenous people. The Akroá-Gamella are an ethnic group that has sought the demarcation of their traditional lands in Maranhão for four decades. Allied with local politicians, Equatorial’s actions have contributed to heightened tensions in the region. Since 2016, the Indigenous people in this territory have been under frequent attacks. During one attack, in 2017, several Akroá-Gamella individuals had their hands cut off.\textsuperscript{128}

In 2018, a Maranhão court ordered the immediate suspension\textsuperscript{129} of the work by the company within the territory, revising an earlier decision that did not recognize the community as Indigenous.\textsuperscript{130, 131}

That same year, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office also denounced CEMAR/Equatorial for signing a null and insufficient agreement with the Indigenous Krikati people and FUNAI to allow the passage of two transmission lines through the Krikati Indigenous land.

Spanish bank Santander loaned US$341 million to the Equatorial Group between 2017 and 2020, and Standard Bank, based in South Africa, US$80 million.\textsuperscript{133} The group’s principal shareholders include BlackRock, the CPP Investment Board, the Government Pension Fund of Norway, Vanguard, and Schroders.\textsuperscript{134}
The Chinese presence in Latin America, Brazil, and the Amazon can be identified by the massive amount of money that China has injected into the region. In the past ten years, US$71 billion has been spent by China to secure acquisitions of companies in Latin America, and more than a quarter of all commodity exports from the region go to the country.\(^{142}\)

The current stock of Chinese investments in the region amounts to US$207 billion, mainly in the forms of infrastructure, energy, mining, fossil fuels, agribusiness, and technology. Chinese commercial transactions with Latin America already exceed US$200 billion.\(^{143}\) China has also provided US$141 billion in credit over the past decade\(^{144}\) to countries in the region, exceeding that provided by institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank.

Much of that money has gone to Brazil. For example, a Chinese state-owned investment company controls LP Sementes\(^{145}\), a company that emerged from the purchase of Dow AgroSciences Sementes e Biotecnologia Brasil, which owns 20 percent of the corn seed in the domestic market.

Hunan Dakang Pasture Farming is the majority owner of the Brazilian trading company and grain processor Fiagril Ltda., which processes soybeans and corn in Mato Grosso. About 60 percent of China’s total soy imports come from Brazil, and China is the largest importer of this product in the world. The Chinese company COFCO is Brazil’s third-largest soy exporter, behind Bunge and Cargill.\(^{146}\)

In addition to soy, China also imports more than 60 percent of Brazil’s iron ore, especially from Vale\(^{147}\), the most prominent culprit of environmental and Indigenous rights violations in this report.

Chinese investors are also behind the 2,500-kilometer Belo Monte transmission line\(^{148}\) running from Pará to Rio de Janeiro. They have invested more than US$6 billion in this expansion of the electrical grid. Much of the Chinese money invested in Brazil has gone into the energy\(^{149}\), oil, and petrochemical sectors.

When it comes to meat exports, Brazil increased animal protein sales to China by 53 percent in 2019 alone.\(^{150}\) This meat comes from companies like JBS, Marfrig, and Minerva, all of which are tied to substantial environmental liabilities. The consequences of China’s increased demand for Brazilian products, commodities and infrastructure projects can be found everywhere in the Amazon, especially the multitude of social and environmental rights violations.\(^{151}\)

Billions of dollars in Chinese capital are also being directed to at least three major railroad projects that cut through the Amazon\(^{152}\) and to dozens of ports on the Tapajós River. The main objective of these investments is to improve the flow of soy and iron ore. In its way are Indigenous peoples and traditional communities.
The violations exposed in this report would not be possible without international financing provided by major players of global finance to companies contributing to the destruction of the largest tropical rainforest on the planet.

To hold each one of them accountable, it is necessary to reveal who they are, which companies they support, how much and in what ways they invest, and what responsibilities they have or have not assumed, in order to ensure that the entire supply chain they finance is free of deforestation, violations of Indigenous lands, and environmental crimes in general.

The trillions of dollars these institutions manage, which come from hundreds of thousands of people—whether they be bank clients or individual investors—represent a powerful lever for applying pressure on the giants of agribusiness, mining, and the energy industry to make it loud and clear that they can no longer neglect their environmental and social responsibilities.

Around the world, people are watching how corporations and governments respond to the climate crisis, and will no longer accept the business-as-usual scenario that endangers the future of our planet.

This report is a call to action.

Among the world of asset management firms and investment banks, the Top Six major financial corporations analyzed in this report—BlackRock, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Vanguard, Bank of America, and Dimensional Fund Advisors—together contributed more than US$18 billion to the companies scrutinized in the report’s selected case studies between 2017 and 2020.153

We draw attention to these six institutions due to the fact that each one of them invests in more than half of the companies cited in the report, and because they are U.S.-based corporations, where Amazon Watch is headquartered, which facilitates the possibility of greater dialogue, engagement, and campaigning. (See the Methodology section for more details.)

Although many of these corporations have made public promises and commitments to environmental, social, and, in some cases, Indigenous rights, they continue to invest in companies with histories of social and environmental rights violations.

These corporations must be held responsible, their investors must know what their money is contributing to, and the general public must also be aware. It is essential to expose the violations in which these firms are complicit to show that the environmental and human rights commitments that these firms claim to hold are often no more than hypothetical. The time has come to act and move from talk to practice.

In addition to these six American institutions, our research also names various other corporations based in different countries, including prominent banks and investment funds based in France, Japan, England, Spain, China, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Germany, Australia, and many other countries beyond Brazil. A fuller list of other institutions identified during the research for this report and information about their investments in the companies mentioned in the cases studies can be found at the end of this document in the Appendix.154
BlackRock is the largest asset management firm in the world, responsible for more than US$7.3 trillion in investments. It is also the institution that, by a wide margin, invests in the most companies listed in this report: US$8.2 billion in total.

BlackRock is invested in every single company that this report was able to find financial data for: Anglo American, Belo Sun, Cargill, Cosan, Eletrobras, Energisa, Equatorial, Vale, and JBS.

Many of the assets that BlackRock manages are held in index funds, which track market indices, and are offered to investors around the world. In Brazil, the Brazilian stock exchange, known as B3, creates many of the indices upon which index funds in the country are offered, including indices which claim to include sustainability criteria but which have not prevented companies with a history of involvement in environmental issues from being included.

BlackRock has no policy for how to handle investments that may negatively impact the rights of Indigenous peoples. Nor has it committed to pressuring the companies it invests in to conduct their business in a way that will help end deforestation of tropical rainforests like the Amazon.

In fact, BlackRock has acted much to the contrary: a 2019 report by Amazon Watch and Friends of the Earth showed that BlackRock is the world’s largest investor in companies behind deforestation in the Amazon and around the world. Amazon Watch’s recent report, Investing in Amazon Crude, showed that in late 2019, BlackRock held as much as US$2.5 billion of stocks in oil companies operating in the Western Amazon.

As the BlackRock’s Big Problem campaign has highlighted, the asset manager and its spokespeople claim to take the climate crisis seriously but have done little to demonstrate a commitment to truly ending their role in causing it.
With more than 200 million clients in 160 countries, Citigroup is the first U.S. bank in the Top Six financial firms of this report. Citi has invested almost US$2.2 billion between 2017 and 2020 in Anglo American, Cargill, Cosan, Eletrobras, Energisa, Vale, and JBS. Its shareholders include BlackRock and Vanguard.

In its 2020 Environmental and Social Policy Framework, Citi does not expressly mention the situation in the Amazon and Brazil. The bank says it is committed to mitigating the climate crisis, helping transition to a low-carbon economy, and reducing environmental impacts in the areas where it operates and through the investments it supports.

The document also states that Citi will “treat transactions with extra caution and conduct enhanced due diligence” when the company’s activities may pose “adverse effects to areas used or traditionally claimed by an Indigenous community; their communal self-preservation based on traditional ways of life; or their use or enjoyment of critical cultural heritage that is essential to their identity and/or the cultural, ceremonial or spiritual aspects of their lives.” Finally, the bank affirms that it expects projects in which it invests to have made efforts toward achieving Free, Prior, and Informed Consent with impacted Indigenous peoples.

However, this seems to be contradicted by the cases in this report, as well as the fact that Amazon Watch revealed in a previous report that, between 2017 and 2019, Citi invested US$827 million in oil companies that operate in the Western Amazon – GeoPark, Frontera Energy, and Andes Petroleum – whose extraction is not only disastrous for the climate, but also fiercely resisted by Indigenous communities.

With its total assets in excess of US$2.6 trillion, JPMorgan is the largest bank in the United States and the seventh-largest in the world. The bank finances eight of the 11 companies included in this report: Anglo American, Cargill, Cosan, Eletrobras, Energisa, Equatorial, Vale, and JBS, for a total amount of US$2.4 billion during the selected period.

JPMorgan is a signatory to various human rights commitments around the world, such as the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, and the Equator Principles. Despite a recent vague commitment to align its investment practices with the Paris accords, JPM has failed to announce policies that would limit its financing of industries that violate Indigenous rights and incur further deforestation, instead choosing to focus its efforts on increasing support for alternative energy sources.

In fact, the bank's policies towards Indigenous peoples and supply chain risks to the environment caused by investment companies are quite generic. In the document detailing its social and environmental policy, JPMorgan says it expects “alignment with the objectives and requirements of IFC Performance Standard 7 on Indigenous Peoples, including with respect to circumstances requiring Free, Prior and Informed Consent”. However, the bank does not establish any binding obligations in this regard. Moreover, we are not aware of evidence of this policy's implementation, and the cases presented in this report suggest that the bank does not have adequate monitoring mechanisms.

With an advantage of US$70 billion over its competitors, JPMorgan is also the world’s largest banker of fossil fuels, with a total investment of US$268 billion in this industry, according to research by Rainforest Action Network.

JPMorgan is a signatory to various human rights commitments around the world, such as the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, and the Equator Principles. Despite a recent vague commitment to align its investment practices with the Paris accords, JPM has failed to announce policies that would limit its financing of industries that violate Indigenous rights and incur further deforestation, instead choosing to focus its efforts on increasing support for alternative energy sources.
Between 2017 and 2020, Bank of America, the second-largest bank in the United States after JPMorgan Chase, contributed US$1.5 billion to seven companies featured in this report: Anglo American, Cargill, Cosan, Eletrobras, Energisa, Vale, and JBS.177

In its social and environmental policy guide, Bank of America states that “climate change poses a significant risk to our business, our customers and the communities where we live and work.”178 The bank also recognizes that, due to its size, “it has a responsibility and an important role to play in helping to mitigate and build resilience to climate change to accelerate the transition from a high-carbon to a low-carbon society.”179

Bank of America says it supports the Paris Agreement and is a member of the Equator Principles Association and claims to conduct its business in line with the conventions of the International Labor Organization, for example.180 The bank’s policy recognizes that Indigenous peoples are under threat and states that it takes steps to ascertain whether the businesses it supports are in line with other international standards, such as the International Finance Corporation Performance Standard 7 on Indigenous peoples. However, it should be clear that the companies in this report that Bank of America finances do not meet that standard.

Bank of America also claims to take the risks of the commodity trade into account and analyze the impacts caused by large dams, deforestation, and extractive industries. However, the monitoring carried out by the bank is woefully insufficient, since it fails to identify that its investments are going into companies related to serious violations of Indigenous peoples’ rights and threats to the environment.

As the world’s second-largest asset manager, behind BlackRock, Vanguard invests in eight companies featured in this report: Anglo American, Cargill, Cosan, Eletrobras, Energisa, Equatorial, Vale, and JBS, with US$2.7 billion invested in these companies between 2017 and 2020. With over US$6 trillion under its management in total,174 Vanguard is the world’s largest investment fund manager. This business model brings together the retirement pensions of millions of clients. In the case of Vanguard, that means more than 30 million people in 170 countries. On its website, it is impossible to find any mention of commitments to the environment or Indigenous peoples.175

The firm presents itself as having the “radical idea” that “the investor’s interests come first.”176

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Vanguard Investments in millions USD

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*Potássio do Brasil and Bom Futuro group were not analyzed due to lack of data*
The only private equity firm among the Top Six investors, Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA), invested a total sum of a bit over US$1 billion in Anglo American, Cargill, Cosan, Eletrobras, Energisa, Equatorial, Vale, and JBS between 2017 and 2020.

The company’s full investment portfolio, however, includes a total of US$514 billion under its management. Without any kind of social, environmental, or Indigenous rights commitment whatsoever listed on its official website, DFA’s only expressed commitment appears to be maximizing profit.

The firm claims to offer a varied menu of strategies for “the highest possible returns.” How these returns are obtained appears to be a secondary concern for DFA.

### DIMENSIONAL FUND ADVISORS

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*Potássio do Brasil and Bom Futuro group were not analyzed due to lack of data.
RECOMMENDATIONS

For the second year in a row, the Association of Brazil’s Indigenous Peoples, in partnership with Amazon Watch, is revealing a network of national and international actors involved in conflicts in Indigenous territories, land invasions, deforestation, and human rights violations in the Brazilian Amazon.

The commitments found in governmental and private sector policies, which financial institutions claim to adopt – if they even do make such claims – can no longer just be documents lost in the tangle of information displayed in each entity’s website. These commitments need to be real and immediately implemented.

This report outlines the following recommendations to bridge the gap between policy and practice.
FOR COMPANIES OPERATING IN OR WITH PROJECTS IN BRAZIL:


2. Adopt a zero-tolerance policy for any acts of violence against environmental or land defenders committed in areas where the company operates.

3. Refrain from any and all activities that may contribute to deforestation and threats to Indigenous rights and lands.

4. Exclude from your production chains all direct or indirect suppliers involved with deforestation, invasions of Indigenous lands, or other threats described in this report.

5. Make internal processes for product tracing publicly available that allow transparency of your entire supply chain, down to the smallest administrative units, for better monitoring by government regulators and civil society.

FOR IMPORTING COMPANIES:

1. Commit to zero deforestation policies and policies guaranteeing respect for Indigenous and human rights, with verifiable targets and publicly available progress reports.

2. Exclude companies from your supply chain that are directly or indirectly involved with deforestation, invasions of Indigenous lands, human rights violations, or other threats described in this report.

3. Refine mechanisms for controlling and monitoring production chains to improve the tracking of commodities all the way from their sources, ensuring transparency for all parties.

4. Require that supplying companies for which violations have been identified make immediate adjustments to ensure that their supply chains are free of these violations within one year or face severed business ties.

FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:

1. Commit to zero deforestation policies and policies guaranteeing respect for Indigenous and human rights, with verifiable targets and progress reports made publicly available.

2. Create or strengthen internal control and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that no investments occur in areas involving environmental destruction, human rights violations, and conflicts in Indigenous lands.

3. Require that any company receiving financing develop binding policies that safeguard Indigenous rights, such as the right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent; and require that these companies eliminate deforestation in their production chains and adopt transparency measures related to their suppliers as criteria for receiving financing or investments.

4. Conduct periodic due diligence of companies receiving financing based on the highest standards of human and socio-environmental rights, regardless of the level of the financial institution’s direct or indirect relationship with these companies.

5. Exclude finance for companies that present systematic violations of social and environmental rights and human rights or that refuse to implement comprehensive policies for zero deforestation and for respecting Indigenous rights.

FOR GOVERNMENTS AND POLICYMAKERS AROUND THE WORLD:

1. Create monitoring, control, and transparency mechanisms for financial institutions, commodity traders, and importers that have a direct or indirect relationship with the Brazilian Amazon.

2. Demand that products imported by each country are not contributing to the destruction of the Amazon or to violations of the rights of Indigenous and traditional communities.

3. In case of recurring breaches and violations, stop the importation of products from companies involved in irregularities, act to prevent these companies from receiving any further financing by public banks, and end subsidies and other incentives for financing from private financiers.

4. Refrain from entering into trade agreements, including the EU-Mercosur agreement, until robust, verifiable safeguards are in place ensuring the preservation of Indigenous rights and territories in the Brazilian Amazon.
BACKGROUND

THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS OFFER CONTEXT TO DECRYPT THE COMPLEX SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS THAT IN THE LAST YEARS, DURING BOLSONARO’S GOVERNMENT, GAVE RISE TO THE DESTRUCTIVE TRENDS FACING THE AMAZON AND ITS INDIGENOUS AND TRADITIONAL COMMUNITIES.
Life on Earth depends on the Amazon. The largest tropical rainforest in the world helps maintain climate stability, distribute rain throughout South America, and sequester vast quantities of carbon dioxide (CO₂), one of the primary greenhouse gases.

Deforestation has already reached 17 percent in all of the Amazon Basin and almost 20 percent in the Brazilian Amazon. The rise in deforestation, combined with global climate change, can result in the rapid conversion of the rainforest to a savanna, releasing large amounts of carbon into the atmosphere, further exacerbating climate chaos. Scientists report evidence based on climate cycles and rampant deforestation in the Amazon Basin, that the rainforest is reaching a point of no return. The tipping point has arrived, and it is now.

Nobody defends the preservation of life in the rainforest better than Indigenous and traditional peoples. Studies show that Indigenous Territories (TIs) are the definitive barrier against deforestation and forest degradation.

There is a global connection between Indigenous Territories and conservation. Indigenous peoples make up 5 percent of the world’s population, yet their lands contain 80 percent of its biodiversity, making their struggle to defend their traditional territories of critical importance for the future of the planet. In 2019, for the first time, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) endorsed the role of Indigenous peoples as forest stewards, recognizing their knowledge and practices as vital contributions to climate resilience.

Protected areas in the Brazilian Amazon inhabited by forest peoples include Indigenous Territories (TIs), extractive reserves (RESEX), and Sustainable Development Reserves (SDR) that add up to 128.5 million hectares — an area equivalent to Pará state or three times the size of the state of California.

These protected areas hold 56 percent of the total carbon stock in the Brazilian Amazon by storing and preventing the release of associated greenhouse gas emissions. Safeguarding the protected areas in the Amazon means defending the balance of life on Earth.

In the first eight months of 2020, the Ministry of the Environment (MMA) had more than $4.7 million (26.5 million BRL) in its budget to prevent and combat environmental disasters but had only spent just over US$18,713 (105 thousand BRL), US 0.4 percent of its budget, according to an Observatório do Clima survey. This decision by the government made its recklessly anti-environmental agenda clear.

Photo: Vinícius Mendonça/Ibama

THE AMAZON IN CRISIS
The world is witnessing the torching of the Amazon, an environmental tragedy that is now destroying untouched forests. This year’s devastation is not limited to the Amazon biome, but has also been particularly severe in the world’s largest wetland, the Pantanal, as well as the Cerrado tropical savanna. Drought and criminal fires have devastated almost every one of Brazil’s six biomes.

From January 1 to September 13, 2020, INPE’s fire monitoring program (Programa Queimadas) recorded 130,406 fires in the country, the highest recorded for this same period since 2010. Compared to 2019, the number of fires in Brazilian forests has already risen 10 percent.

The Amazon was the area most affected by fires in 2020. By September 12, INPE recorded 60,675 fires in the region, 8 percent more than the records for the same period in 2019 (56,085). In the Amazon’s Indigenous Territories, hot spot alerts increased 77 percent in July, compared to the same month in 2019—from 305 to 539. In the first four months of 2020, deforestation alerts on Indigenous lands in the region grew 59 percent compared to the same period in 2019. The data confirmed the correlation between increases of illegal logging and fires in these territories.

The escalation of Amazon fires coincided with a marked increase in the Brazilian army’s presence in the region and a federal decree that prohibited the use of fire in the biome for four months. Between May and August, a period when the army was present in the Amazon, the number of fires was 39,187, essentially the same as in 2019 (38,952). This consistency confirms the failure of military-led environmental enforcement, touted by the Bolsonaro regime as a means to combat Amazon deforestation.

As the fires spread throughout Brazil, the government denied the magnitude of the crisis. Instead, it attempted to undermine the legitimacy of government institutions accurately documenting the destruction. After news of the explosion of fires in September, the vice president and head of the Amazon Council, Hamilton Mourão, said that INPE employees are opposed to the federal government.
DEFORESTATION: 10 percent of Brazil’s forests destroyed in 35 years

According to the latest MapBiomas data[^205], 10 percent of Brazil’s native vegetation was deforested in the last 35 years[^206]. From 1985 to 2019, a total of 87.2 million hectares of native vegetation were destroyed in the country. More than half of this loss occurred in the Amazon, where agriculture is responsible for 80 percent of the deforestation[^207].

The destruction is increasing. According to INPE, deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon exceeded 1 million hectares in 2019, 34.4 percent more than in 2018, setting a record for the decade[^208]. And the devastation continues to accelerate in 2020: the 2019/2020 PRODES system is expected to indicate between 1.2 million and 1.5 million hectares of deforested area, an increase up to 50 percent compared to the previous year[^209].

Deforestation in the Amazon advances into protected areas and threatens Indigenous Territories.

[^205]: Source: see References on page 87
[^206]: Source: see References on page 87
[^207]: Source: see References on page 87
[^208]: Source: see References on page 87
[^209]: Source: see References on page 87
Bolsonaro Encourages Violations of Social and Environmental Rights

During an event for investors in Saudi Arabia in 2019, President Jair Bolsonaro stated that he empowered the actors responsible for the fires in the Brazilian Amazon by “disagreeing with the environmental policy of previous administrations.” It was a public acknowledgement that the destruction of the Amazon is intentional and that government policy equates to: let it burn.

Positions like this have further isolated Brazil on the international stage, provoking foreign investors to react amid an increase of Indigenous land invasions.

According to data from the Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI), in 2019 there was an increase in cases in 16 of the 19 categories of violence tracked by their annual “Violence Against Indigenous Peoples in Brazil.” In the category “land invasions, illegal exploitation of resources and damage to property,” cases jumped from 109 registered in 2018 to 256 cases in 2019 in at least 151 Indigenous lands, affecting 143 Indigenous peoples, in 23 States. In 2019 alone there was an increase of 135 percent in the cases related to invasions in comparison to those registered in 2018.

During the first year of the Bolsonaro administration, seven murders were recorded, the largest number of murdered Indigenous leaders in the past 11 years. Mining is the leading cause of this violence, followed by land invasions and illegal logging. Of the 300 defenders of the Brazilian Amazon murdered in the past decade, only 14 cases were prosecuted.

Illegal deforestation is directly linked to the fires in the Amazon: the greater the clearing of the forest, the greater the number of hotspots. In fact, the ten Amazonian municipalities that registered the most fires in 2019 were also those that had the highest deforestation rates.

In August of 2019, NASA detected massive columns of smoke leaving the city of Novo Progresso, in the Terra do Meio region (state of Pará), and the southeastern part of the state of Amazonas—regions considered agricultural-frontiers.

Novo Progresso, one of the most deforested regions in 2019, containing 2.2 million cattle—Brazil’s largest herd—is precisely where farmers and businesses in the region organized the “Dia do Fogo” (Day of Fire) on August 10, 2019, to set fires and show support for Bolsonaro. A year after these criminal acts caused fires to triple in southwestern Pará, no one has been arrested or charged. Impunity continues to be one of the leading factors encouraging the destruction of the Amazon.

Of the 981,000 fires that occurred in Brazil between July and October last year, half occurred in the areas where meatpacking companies such as JBS and Marfrig make purchases and around soy traders Bunge’s and Cargill’s silos, according to a study that cross-checked NASA data with that of companies’ supply chains. It has become evident that behind the fires and the deforestation, there are powerful economic interests: cattle raising, illegal timber trade, and soy production.

According to a report by the Federal Prosecution Office, the deforestation of the rainforest went hand in hand with the growth of cattle herds in the Amazon, with an increase from 47 million animals in 2000 to around 85 million today. Of the 215 million head of cattle currently in the entire country, almost 40 percent graze in the Amazon and cattle occupy 80 percent of the region’s deforested area.

Behind the Fire: Deforestation, Cattle Ranching, Soy, and Illegal Logging

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This represents more than double the 109 cases registered in 2018.

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An Increase in Land Invasions and Violence Against Indigenous and Traditional Peoples Throughout Brazil

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Bolsonaro Regime Blocks Indigenous Land Titling

The Bolsonaro administration consistently violates the rights of Indigenous peoples and has encouraged the deliberate theft of Indigenous lands.

Of the 1,298 Indigenous lands in Brazil, 829 (63 percent) have some pending government action required to complete the demarcation process and register as a traditional Indigenous Territory. Of these 829, a total of 536 lands (64 percent) have not had any action taken by the Brazilian government. The Federal Constitution of 1988 determined that all Indigenous lands in Brazil should be demarcated by 1993. Since taking office, Jair Bolsonaro has not signed any demarcation processes and has made repeated statements refusing to recognize Indigenous peoples' rights to their territories. Moreover, he made a campaign promise not to demarcate any Indigenous land. As an enemy of native peoples and the Constitution, the president has kept his word.

André Mendonça, current Minister of Justice — a governmental body to which the national Indigenous agency FUNAI (Fundação Nacional do Índio) is subordinate — signed an opinion supporting the "Marco Temporal" thesis when he was the General Counsel for the Federal Government. The unconstitutional Marco Temporal legal-political thesis contends that only Indigenous peoples who were inhabiting their ancestral lands at the enactment of the Constitution on October 5, 1988, will be entitled to the territory, despite the brutal history of Indigenous peoples' displacement prior to that date.

The final decision rests with the Federal Supreme Court, which can decide the matter at any time. If accepted, the Marco Temporal thesis can paralyze around 750 demarcation processes. With no rights to their territories, which is critically important for Indigenous peoples, the Amazon — and the world — will also pay the price.

At the end of 2019, Indigenous leader Paulo Paulino Guajajara and four others were killed in the Araribóia TI in Maranhão. Paulino was a member of the "Guardians of the Forest", a group of Indigenous land defenders created precisely because the federal government is unwilling to protect Indigenous Territories. In Arariboia, 16,000 Guajajara and Awa-Guajá Indigenous peoples have long been subjected to a cycle of violence that has intensified in the last two decades due to the growing presence of illegal loggers.

According to CIMI, 49 Guajajara Indigenous peoples were murdered in Maranhão as a result of conflicts with loggers between 2000 and 2019 — 12 of them inside Arariboia. Since the government fails to protect Indigenous peoples, the "Guardians of the Forest" risk their lives fighting criminals within the Arariboia reserve. The Guardians also defend the Awa-Guajá Indigenous peoples, who live in voluntary isolation and are considered one of the most threatened Indigenous groups on the planet.
Mining on Indigenous Lands Could Soon Be Permitted

In February of this year, Jair Bolsonaro sent Bill no. 191/2020 to Congress. This bill permits small and large-scale mining projects on Indigenous lands and nullifies the veto power of Indigenous peoples over such projects, violating the Brazilian Constitution and international agreements enshrined by Brazilian law, such as International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169.

Bill no. 191/2020 also authorizes cultivating genetically modified seeds, constructing hydroelectric dams, cattle ranching, oil and gas projects, and tourism within Indigenous territories. The bill can be voted on at any time in Congress, where the Rural Caucus controls 48 percent of the seats. Another legal maneuver that will directly impact Indigenous peoples is the “regulatory guillotine” announced by Brazil’s National Mining Agency (ANM) in partnership with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The objective is to reduce the regulation of the mining sector as much as possible.

In September, Brazil’s federal government announced the establishment of the Mining and Development Plan (PMD), under development since 2019, this plan encouraged the introduction of Bill 191. The PMD defines the Bolsonaro government’s agenda for mining in the period from 2020 to 2023, addressing priorities such as the advancement of mining in new areas, government investments toward geological research for the sector, investments and financing, innovation and sustainability. However, the plan really intends to make more space for foreign capital, the relaxation of environmental laws, and the destruction of the environment, while encouraging the violation of Indigenous peoples’ rights, opening their territories for mining.

Current data indicates that official mining exploration requests in Amazonian TIs rose 91 percent since the beginning of the Bolsonaro administration. This was the first time since 2013 that requests for mining authorization have increased.

In the last ten years, the ANM registered 656 mining requests, including everything from prospecting to extraction, within the boundaries of Indigenous Territories. In this period, the agency even granted mining licenses in Indigenous lands demarcated by the federal government, which is illegal and unconstitutional.

Environmental Licensing Increasingly Favors the Private Sector

Recent history further illustrates that the public cannot trust Brazilian politicians when it comes to respecting Indigenous peoples’ rights. In February 2020, Rodrigo Maia, President of the Chamber of Deputies of Brazil, sent the Bill no. 191/2020 to a special commission for analyses after saying, in November 2019, that he would table the bill in response to the pressure of the Indigenous organizations. In June, in response to a request from agribusiness, he said he is likely to put the new environmental licensing law to a vote.

Experts have severely criticized the Bill for facilitating further violations of social and environmental rights in Brazil and making the licensing process, already corrupted by spurious relations between large companies and politicians, merely a formality.

It is no coincidence that the Minister of the Environment, Ricardo Salles, in a ministerial meeting in April 2019, spoke of “taking advantage of the pandemic” to “run the cattle herd” over environmental protections given that this wave of deregulation would go largely unnoticed by the press.

From requests for research and exploration, to operational extraction, mining threatens extensive areas of the Amazon and advances into Indigenous Territories.

(Source: see References on page 87)
Legalizing the Theft of Indigenous Lands

Both at the federal level and in the governments of states within the Legal Amazon, bills aim to authorize the theft of Indigenous territories by rural landowners.

In Mato Grosso, Proposed Supplementary Law (PLC) 17/2020 attempts to authorize the registration of farms overlapping Indigenous lands in the state’s Rural Environmental Registry (CAR). An exclusive survey conducted by De Olho nos Ruralistas shows the full extent of this problem across the country. This bill, considered unconstitutional, is similar to FUNAI’s Normative Instruction (IN) 09/2020, which aims to grant legal titles to private landowners on Indigenous lands whose demarcation has not yet been completed, directly attacking the constitutional rights of Indigenous peoples. This IN was a direct request from the Secretary of Land Affairs of the Ministry of Agriculture, Luiz Antônio Nabhan Garcia, who has been actively working to legalize the transfer of Indigenous lands to agriculture and ranching operations.

Both proposals have been questioned by civil society organizations and Brazilian bodies such as the Federal Prosecution Office (MPF) and the National Human Rights Council (CNDH).

If approved, Bill no. 2633/2020 would stimulate new cases of public land invasions and grant amnesty to criminals who invaded lands between 2011 and 2018. The bill endangers Brazilian forests and traditional and Indigenous populations under the pretext of regularizing land titles. According to Dinaman Tuxá, from APIB’s Executive Coordinating Committee, even though it has not yet been passed, the bill has already spawned an increase in invasions of Indigenous lands. “Several people are using the weak and criminal argument that there is a pending law that will legitimize the possession of stolen lands, so they are promoting theft. This is already happening in Pará and in other parts of the Brazilian Amazon. People believe that invading the land is worth it because, in the end, they will become the owners.” To Dinaman, agribusiness will be the primary beneficiary because it is responsible for the invasions.

Data from the Núcleo de Altos Estudos Amazônicos da Universidade Federal do Pará, in partnership with the Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM), show that land-grabbers have already taken 11.6 million hectares of public forests in the Amazon — about 21.7 million American football fields.

The map shows the overlap of the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR) within Indigenous Territories. Farmers use the government’s CAR system to register their properties and take possession of Indigenous lands.
Broke, Militarized, and Chaotically Managed: The Agony of Environmental Agencies and FUNAI

Since taking office, Jair Bolsonaro and Ricardo Salles—who was appointed Minister of the Environment even though he was convicted of illegally favoring a mining company while he was the Environment Secretary in the state of São Paulo—have promoted the dismantling of environmental agencies.

The Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), responsible for environmental monitoring, and FUNAI, with its Ethno-environmental Protection Fronts (FPE) on the front lines, work together to curb the invasion of Indigenous lands in partnership with the Federal Police along with environmental inspectors from each state of the Amazon and agencies like the Public Prosecutors’ Office. Without funding, their staff is unable to fulfill their roles, leading to an increase in land invasions.

IBAMA’s budget for 2020 is 31 percent less than in 2019, and the number of inspectors has plummeted 55 percent in the past decade. FUNAI lost 23 percent of its budget between 2013 and 2019.

 Meanwhile, FUNAI’s current president, Marcelo Augusto Xavier da Silva, has strong ties with the farming lobby, exposing a clear conflict of interest.

In contrast, US$92 million (520 million BRL) was allocated to the armed forces to reduce deforestation in the Amazon. This is more than ten times the budget of IBAMA, Brazil’s main environmental enforcement agency, which received only US$8.9 million (50 million BRL).

At the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio), the agency responsible for managing protected areas, soldiers were appointed to leadership positions of the five regional administrations. The technical expertise of environmental professionals is being ignored in order to give positions to the military which has limited knowledge in the environmental field.

In September 2020, the National Association of Environmental Workers (ASCEMA) released a 34-page dossier with a list of complaints about the “dismantling” of public sector policies during the Bolsonaro administration. The civil servants testified that there are “constant attacks against social and environmental agencies and entities.”

“[Since 2019, there have been] attempts to incriminate and intimidate Indigenous peoples, environmentalists, and non-governmental organizations, in addition to intimidating and restricting the action of environmental officials, resulting in a real and deliberate dismantling of public environmental institutions,” according to the dossier that was sent to Congress, Pope Francis, and international institutions, including the United Nations.
According to data obtained by the National Committee for the Indigenous Life and Memory, by October 19, almost 37,000 Indigenous peoples were infected by COVID-19 in Brazil, from 158 different peoples, and about 852 Indigenous peoples had died. Bolsonaro’s unconstitutional veto of the federal government’s obligation to guarantee access to drinking water and hospital beds for Indigenous peoples during the pandemic further aggravated the situation.

According to APIB’s lawyer, Eloy Terena, how the pandemic was handled in Brazil has been especially catastrophic for Indigenous peoples. This led APIB to appeal to the Supreme Court (STF). On August 5, in a historic trial, the STF determined in a unanimous vote from all nine justices that the federal government must adopt measures to protect Indigenous peoples during the pandemic. The decision was ruled in favor of the suit brought by APIB and requires the development and fulfillment of a containment plan for COVID-19.

Despite the favorable decision, the justices did not order the withdrawal of illegal settlers who are currently occupying seven Indigenous lands: Yanomami lands in the states of Amazonas and Roraima; Karipuna and Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau TIs in Rondônia; from Arariboia Ti in Maranhão; and Munduruku, Trincheira Bacajá, and Kayapó TIs in Pará. Illegal occupation of these lands expose Indigenous communities to even further threats to their safety. Yet, land-grabbers, miners, loggers, and invaders continue to operate uninhibited in the Amazon.

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COVID-19: Another Threat Against the Lives of Indigenous Peoples

The Supreme Court’s decision signaled a historic victory for Brazil’s Indigenous peoples and a defeat for the Bolsonaro government. Luiz Eloy Terena was the second Indigenous lawyer to successfully argue a case before the Supreme Court, and the first to win a constitutional jurisdiction suit since the Court’s creation.

“This case is the voice of Indigenous peoples in this court. It is the Indigenous peoples’ cry for help. This initiative is a historic case, because for the first time in the context of constitutional discussion, Indigenous peoples come to the Judiciary in their own name, with their own lawyer, to defend their own rights,” he told the court.

For the Indigenous leader Ailton Krenak, the suit was a “turning point from the point of view of legal history” regarding Indigenous peoples’ rights, and the right of Indigenous peoples to represent themselves and not be represented by FUNAI or any other state agency.

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The Agribusiness sector, including meat processing, employs approximately 800 thousand people in Brazil. Estimates show that between 25 and 50 percent of these people may have been infected in meatpacking factories. In many cases, Indigenous peoples comprise the front lines of this spread.

In Dourados, Mato Grosso do Sul, an Indigenous man was infected with COVID-19 due to an outbreak at the JBS plant where he was employed and unknowingly brought the disease to his village. In Foz do Iguacu, a similar situation occurred. There, a young Guarani was the first case of COVID-19 in his community and was infected as an employee at a slaughterhouse from Lar Cooperativa Agroindustrial, one of the largest agribusiness cooperatives in Brazil that remained in operation during the pandemic. The disease later spread throughout his community.

Cities surrounded by major mining and energy projects are experiencing the same tragic spread of the disease. In southeastern Pará, Tocantins, and Maranhão, Indigenous lands split by Vale and Eletronorte projects have a higher likelihood of workers spreading COVID-19 into Indigenous communities.

Indigenous territories in Sororó, of the Suruí Aikewara people; Trocará, of the Asurini people of Tocantins; and Xikrin of the Cateté, are witnessing spikes in COVID-19 and are also split by federal highways. The Mãe Maria Indigenous land, belonging to the Gavião people, in addition to being impacted by a road, is split by Eletronorte’s transmission lines from the Tucuruí hydroelectric plant and by the Carajás railroad, under the management of the Vale mining company.
The Brazilian economic crisis, which has worsened, especially since 2015\textsuperscript{286}, is experiencing its most critical period due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, two of the country’s most powerful economic pillars - agribusiness and mining - have not been shaken because they are considered “essential” and enjoy the direct support of a large part of federal representatives and the Brazilian government\textsuperscript{287}.

A survey carried out by Brazil’s Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock (CNA) shows that the sector’s Gross Value of Production will reach US$129.8 billion (728.6 billion BRL) in 2020\textsuperscript{288}, an increase of 11.8 percent over 2019, which will be the highest figure in the sector’s history. In the midst of the pandemic, the expectation is that the agribusiness sector will account for 23.6 percent of the country’s total GDP. In 2019 it was 21.4 percent\textsuperscript{284}.

Soy and corn were the flagships of agriculture\textsuperscript{290}. Of the expected US$129.8 billion (728.6 billion BRL) gain, US$31.2 billion (175 billion BRL) will correspond to the revenue from oil seeds (up 13 percent over 2019) and US$16 billion (90 billion BRL) from corn (up 32.9 percent from the previous year). Beef revenue is projected to be US$24.7 billion (139 billion BRL), down 19.5 percent from 2019\textsuperscript{291}.

At a breakfast with members of the Parliamentary Farming Front (FPA) in mid-2019, Jair Bolsonaro made clear his total alignment\textsuperscript{292} with the so-called “ruralist caucus” - the parliamentarians linked to agribusiness that do anything to defend their own interests.

“This government is yours,” said Bolsonaro, symbolically handing control of Brazil over to agribusiness\textsuperscript{293}. The daily actions of the president and senior government officials indicate that the statement is taken very seriously.

Comprising of about 300 members of Congress\textsuperscript{294}, almost half of the House and the Senate, the ruralist caucus is considered the most influential part in the organization and negotiation of public policies in the legislative branch, meaning it is almost impossible to oppose its interests.

The politicians connected to this caucus declared to the Brazilian Electoral Justice system that they own at least 189 thousand hectares\textsuperscript{295}, mainly concentrated in the Legal Amazon and the Matopiba region (formed by the state of Tocantins and parts of Maranhão, Piauí, and Bahia), the central axes of agribusiness expansion in the last decade and sites of fierce land conflicts\textsuperscript{296}.

The ruralist caucus is financed\textsuperscript{297} by 38 agribusiness associations maintained by large Brazilian companies, multinationals, and banks, such as Bunge, Cargill, Bayer, Raízen, Monsanto, Minerva Foods, Amaggi, Mosaic Fertilizers, BRF, JBS, Dupont, Nestlé, Klabin, Gerdau, Syngenta, Rabobank, Santander, and others\textsuperscript{298}.

Some of these companies are part of the group\textsuperscript{299} that delivered a letter in July to Vice President Hamilton Mourão\textsuperscript{300} asking the government to combat deforestation in the Amazon. The month before, a group of international investors responsible for managing US$3.7 trillion in assets sent an open letter to seven Brazilian embassies\textsuperscript{301} expressing concern about the increase in deforestation in Brazil, citing what they called “dismantling of environmental and human rights policies.”
Brazilian Soy Production Breaks Records in 2019/2020: The Amazon and Cerrado Pay the Price

With exports valued at more than US$33 billion in 2018, soy — the leading commodity exported by Brazil — is one of the country’s main drivers of deforestation. According to a recent report by Trase and IMACLORA302, there are over 2.6 million hectares of soybean plantations in the Amazon and Cerrado that do not appear in the CAR (Rural Environmental Registry), the mandatory public register for all rural properties in Brazil. The main destination of soy from this region is China and the European Union. The North American companies ADM, Bunge, and Cargill are the largest soy exporters in these areas303, along with the Brazilian company Amaggi.

The soybean crop reached 119.9 million tons in 2019/2020304, an increase of 5.6 percent in relation to the previous period. This record crop once again places Brazil in front of the US as the world’s number one soy producer305.

Brazil is the largest meat exporter in the world, with China and Hong Kong among its leading customers. Driven by Chinese demand, beef exports from Brazil broke a record in 2019 in terms306 of both volume and revenue. There were 1.8 million tons exported with US$7.5 billion in sales307.

Livestock: Devouring the Amazon

These impressive numbers are the result of a complex meat production chain that lacks transparency and favors the widespread bad practices of meat companies, their direct and indirect suppliers, directly contributing to the deforestation of the Amazon.

Livestock is one of the drivers of deforestation in the Amazon, with almost 80 percent of rainforest destruction associated with the expansion of pastures, according to a 2016 study by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO)308. The Zero Deforestation Working Group309 also revealed that 65 percent of the deforested area in this region is utilized as low-quality pasture land.310

A survey conducted by Reporters Brasil311 showed that large companies in the sector, such as JBS, Marfrig, and Frigol, buy cattle from ranchers who have been fined for deforestation in regions where deforestation is most prominent, several of them being the epicenter of the fires in the Amazon312.

Although advances have been made in recent years, the monitoring systems developed by meat companies are still characterized by serious flaws, as audits313 of the systems and inspections by IBAMA have shown.

Furthermore, at least half of the meat companies that operate in the Amazon still have not made any commitments to monitoring their suppliers in a way that ensures that these companies comply with socio-environmental and Indigenous rights. As a result, at least 18,000 cattle are “processed” in the region almost every day without any protection measures in place.314

Yet it is not only the industrial mining that endangers the Amazon, its rivers, and its Indigenous lands. The Federal Prosecution Service estimates that over US$300,000 (1.7 million BRL) in damage is caused for each kilogram of gold illegally extracted in the Amazon315. The minimum amount of time it takes for partial recovery of an area degraded by mining is estimated to be 13 years. Other calculations estimate up to US$335,000 (3 million BRL) in damage for every kilogram of gold and up to 42 years for environmental recovery.316

Mining Attracts Billions in Investments While Causing Irreparable Environmental Damage

The mining industry accounts for 4 percent of Brazil’s GDP and more than 20 percent of the country’s exports.317 The Brazilian Mining Institute (Instituto Brasileiro de Mineração or IBRAM) projects that this sector will attract investments of US$32.5 billion from 2020 to 2024, an 18 percent increase if compared to the forecast for 2019-2023 (US$27.5 billion).318

There are currently more than 9,000 legal mines operating in Brazil319. And the National Mining Agency has the explicit goal of opening up more than 20,000 new areas for mining exploration through public offers and electronic auctions, most of them in the Amazon, including in Indigenous Territories.

In the Amazon, the construction of large, medium, and small power plants are particularly problematic. Belo Monte, one of the largest hydroelectric dam complexes in the world, which was inaugurated after a series of reported socio-environmental rights violations, does not even deliver320 the amount of energy promised. Small Hydroelectric Plants (SHPs), in turn, also put socio-environmental pressure on Indigenous peoples and traditional communities. SHPs, seen as having less detrimental socio-environmental impacts, can actually have systemic consequences even more significant than those of large hydroelectric plants321. The rivers of the Amazon are those most affected by these dams, and foreign financing is a central part of their viability as the cases detailed in this report demonstrate.

Hydroelectric Power Plants Drive Violations and Destroy the Amazon’s Rivers

These projects, which also include thousands of kilometers of power lines, provoke many socio-environmental violations and land conflicts, and bring irreversible destruction to the lands and ways of life of Indigenous peoples, ribeirinhos (traditional riverine peoples), and other traditional communities, while spurring land speculation and violence.322
CONCLUSION

The Brazilian Amazon is an epicenter of the planet’s spiraling human rights and environmental crisis, pushed to the brink by political, economic, and criminal forces intent on reaping profit above all else. The Amazon’s Indigenous and traditional peoples are on the front lines of these conflicts, fighting to defend the rainforest and their homes, cultures, and ways of life from threats that also endanger humanity’s collective welfare.

The devastation of the planet’s largest rainforest, with its grave implications for climatic stability, cannot be simply understood as a Brazilian issue, but rather one that is actively enabled by global markets. From the buyers and traders of conflict commodities to the financial institutions that bankroll the illicit behavior of corporate actors complicit in the destruction, global capital has the power to make or break both a failed economic system and the political power of those who espouse it.

By joining forces to shine a spotlight on today’s crisis and its drivers – and proposing a set of urgent and essential solutions – APIB and Amazon Watch aim to compel complicit global institutions to reform, using their power and influence to ensure adherence to rigorous socio-environmental standards throughout their supply chains and portfolios.

Ignoring the disastrous implications of the rampant environmental and human rights abuses unfolding in the Brazilian Amazon would inevitably lead to mounting social conflicts, investor risk, and runaway climate chaos that would profoundly undermine any future prosperity.

Only a truly global effort can meet the challenges of this pivotal moment. The opportunity remains, but everyone – companies, governments, investors, and Brazilian and international civil society – must work together, swiftly, to accomplish sweeping change. The time to act is now, while there is still time to act.
### APPENDIX

#### MOST FREQUENT INVESTORS*

Investments in millions USD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial institution</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total by company</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Bonds</td>
<td>Credit</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>696.1</td>
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<td>10.5</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>165.6</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>144.3</td>
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<td>UBS</td>
<td>CHE</td>
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<td>85.1</td>
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<td>Vanguard</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2,477.3</td>
<td>264.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Financial institutions with investments in at least four of the companies highlighted, alphabetically ordered. Potássio do Brasil and Bom Futuro group were not analyzed due to lack of data.


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*Some financial institutions have been excluded due to lack of data.*
1 The conversion between dollar (US currency) and real (Brazilian currency) is done on https://www.bcb.gov.br/. The Brazilian Central Bank uses a free market exchange rate.

2 It should be noted that affected Indigenous lands included not only those in states, but also those in urban areas that are located in the municipalities of states. It has an area of 3,571,423 km², which corresponds to about 67% of Brazil's territory.

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11 All the cases mentioned in this report were opened in the judicial system of Brazil, including the Federal Courthouse of the 1st Region of Maraebá. (Old number: # 0001536-03.2009.4.01.3901). https://processual.trf1.jus.br/consultaProcessual/ConsultaProcessual?c=2009.39.01.001545-4). The cases are related to mining activities in the Amazon Basin.


In May of the same year, the Federal Prosecution Office asked the Justice to declare there was an omission in the care provided to Indigenous peoples, and requested that the case be referred to the Federal Public Civil Action Court.


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